In March 2015, the State of Hawaii stopped covering the majority of migrants from countries belonging to the Compact of Free Association (COFA) in its Medicaid program.
I. Introduction
A principal question in health economics is how insurance coverage affects the demand for health services. Those that lack financial resources are often those most in need of medical services, and, in the absence of adequate insurance, low-income populations may forgo necessary medical care. These concerns have been a driving force for the expansion of government-provided or government-subsidized health insurance in many countries around the world, including the United States. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 established subsidies for low-income households to purchase private insurance in marketplaces and incentives for states to expand coverage in their Medicaid programs. As a consequence of the ACA, the percentage of uninsured people in the United States decreased by 41%, a reduction from 48 to 28 million between 2011 and 2015 (Cohen et al, 2017) . Importantly, the ACA had the largest impacts on the poor and on minorities (Cohen et al, 2017 to cover pregnant women and newborns. Second, the Aged, Blind and Disabled (ABD) program continued to be available to eligible COFA migrants as well. The majority of COFA migrants, however, needed to purchase private insurance in the health insurance exchanges established by the ACA in order to continue their medical coverage; they were not eligible for the Medicaid expansion created by the ACA (McElfish, et al. 2015) . COFA migrants were required to select private insurance from the state of Hawaii's health insurance exchange --with the state paying the premium for insurance for households with incomes less than 100% of the FPL provided that they chose a Silver-level plan and could verify income (Hawaii DHS, 2014) .
In this paper, we employ statewide administrative data of all hospital discharges in Hawaii to estimate the effects of expiring Medicaid program coverage on medical utilization among COFA migrants. The data are close to a census of all hospitalizations in Hawaii over the period [2014] [2015] . The data also contain a unique patient identification number which enables us to track individual utilization over time. Using these data, we construct an individual-level panel that covers the 24 months from January 2014 to December 2015, which includes months before and after the expiration of Medicaid benefits. The discharge data contain an ethnicity variable. We employ data for three ethnicities: COFA migrants as the treatment group, non-Hispanic whites as the control group, and Japanese as the placebo group. To address omitted zeros for non-utilizers, we include dummy observations and frequency weights corresponding to population numbers obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS).
To investigate the impact of the expiration of Medicaid program benefits on utilization among COFA migrants, we use a difference-in-difference research design. We show that there was a sharp reduction in the number of emergency and in-patient medical care admissions charged to Hawaii Medicaid (hereafter referred to as 'Medicaid') after the expiration of program benefits for COFA migrants relative to the non-Hispanic white and Japanese populations in Hawaii among people ages 18 to 64. In particular, Medicaid-funded ER visits and inpatient admissions declined by 31% and 19%, respectively. This sharp reduction in utilization is consistent with other studies that have investigated the impact of the expiration of Medicaid benefits such as studies on Tennessee after it discontinued Medicaid benefits (see DeLeire 2019, Tarazi 2017 , Tello-Trillo 2016 . At the same time, there was a substantial increase in the number of emergency room (ER) visits and inpatient admissions charged to private payers, indicating that there was a move towards private insurance among COFA migrants after Medicaid program benefits expired. However, the magnitude of this increase was smaller than the reduction in Medicaid-funded utilizations. As a result, net inpatient admissions and emergency visits declined.
After Medicaid program benefits expired, there was an increase in uninsured ER visits. In particular, uninsured ER visits offset at least 25% of the decline in Medicaid-funded ER use.
This result is likely the consequence of a more onerous enrollment process for private insurance than for Medicaid, which has year-round open enrollment.
We also find that the Medicaid expiration for adults ages 18 to 64 impacted children and infants. CHIPRA eligibility did not change for children under 18 years of age during this period.
We show that the utilization of children ages one to 17 declined. We interpret this as a reverse woodworking effect. Coverage expired for some COFA migrants but many believed that it expired for all migrants. We further show that inpatient utilization of infants declined dramatically after the expiration of benefits. However, Medicaid-funded ER visits by infants increased by a large margin. This result may be the consequence of reduction in ambulatory care for newborns after the Medicaid expiration. 3
The expiration of Medicaid benefits may have reduced utilization of COFA migrants through two possible mechanisms: increased cost-sharing and low take-up of private insurance.
Both mechanisms increase the cost of medical care. First, the expiration of benefits may have increased the per-unit cost of services since Medicaid has a well-established fee schedule with generally lower reimbursement amounts than private insurance, places restrictions on copayments, and prohibits balance billing which is the practice of providers charging patients for what insurers do not reimburse. This increase in prices reduces the consumption of medical services. 4 Second, moving COFA migrants from a relatively simple public insurance scheme to more complicated exchanges might have resulted in lower insurance take-up rates (and hence utilization) due to an increase in the complexity of obtaining insurance coverage. Medicaid has a
year-round open enrollment period. In contrast, private insurers have a six-week open enrollment period. Moreover, COFA migrants had to have first applied for Medicaid and get rejected prior to being able to apply for private insurance. The ramp-up in uninsured ER visits that we saw after the Medicaid expiration is evidence of these difficulties enrolling in private insurance
Another factor for lower insurance take-up is that education levels and literacy rates are substantially lower for COFA migrants compared to other ethnic groups. For example, Akee (2010) showed that 7.8% of adult male immigrants from the FSM have no education, 6.5% have between one and six years of education, and 16.6% have between seven and eight years of education; the average years of schooling in this population is 10 years. Baicker, et al. (2012) has also showed that take-up rates of low-cost health insurance are low among those of lower income and education levels. Despite considerable outreach by advocates during the transition from
Medicaid program coverage to state-subsidized private insurance coverage, this take-up issue was widely expected.
We conclude that these results provide additional evidence on the responsiveness of the demand for health services to the cost of services. A major innovation of this paper is that we show this in a vulnerable migrant population that is substantially poorer than other populations from this literature including in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. The removal of access to the Medicaid program resulted in only some shifting towards private insurance. However, this shift does not fully compensate for the decline in utilizations previously financed by Medicaid.
In addition, we show that uninsured ER visits have increased as a consequence of the expiration of Medicaid benefits. Overall, our results suggest that there are now COFA migrants forgoing health care services. Importantly, the decline in utilization occurred despite stated-subsidized private insurance and an automatic transition from Medicaid to private insurance for migrants enrolled in Medicaid prior to March 2015.
4 Much cited evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Manning, et al. 1987; Newhouse, et al. 1993; Aron-Dine et al. 2013 ) and the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Finkelstein et al, 2012) shows that increased cost sharing results in lower utilization. There is also similar quasi-experimental evidence from Card, et al. (2008) in the United States and Shigeoka (2014) in Japan. A reduction in medical utilization as a consequence of an increase in out-of-pocket expenditures without a corresponding underlying change in health status is termed ex post moral hazard or just moral hazard in the health economics literature (Pauly 1968; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000) .
The balance of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide some institutional background on the history of COFA migrants in Hawaii and their ability to access health insurance. After that, we discuss the discharge data that we employed and how we used it to construct an individual level panel. We then discuss the methods that we employ. After that, we discuss our results and conclude. The non-pregnant, non-ABD COFA adults were instructed to buy private health insurance on the Hawaii Health Connector, the state's health insurance exchange with premiums to be subsidized. On the exchange, COFA migrants could choose from either of two private insurers (Kaiser Permanente or Hawaii Medical Service Association (HMSA)), with the state paying the premium for insurance purchased for those with incomes less than 100% of the FPL provided that they chose a Silver-level plan and could verify household income (Hawaii DHS, 2014). The premium assistance program, however, did not pay for any deductible, co-payment, coinsurance, or other cost-sharing arrangements, in contrast to Hawaii Medicaid coverage.
II. Medicaid Eligibility for COFA Migrants in the State of Hawaii
However, Kaiser waived these costs for those meeting eligibility requirements by demonstrating financial need.
The final policy shift to insurance exchange plans was a source of much confusion in the community. While outreach volunteers and workers held information sessions and went door-todoor to share relevant information, enrollment on the exchange itself was confusing.
Compounding these challenges were the technical challenges troubling the Hawaii Health
Connector website. In 2015, only a few months after the enrollment period for the COFA migrants to change to the private insurance, the Connector was closed down and to be replaced by the federally-managed exchange. This meant that anyone who had been enrolled in the connector had to re-enroll using Healthcare.gov, causing further confusion and additional outreach to the COFA community (Princeton, 2017) . Unlike the Hawaii Health Connector, Healthcare.gov is not available in COFA languages, adding more challenges (Princeton, 2017).
In the year 2015 only, the State's Medicaid program did institute auto-enrollment so those being dropped and those who had not chosen a plan were automatically placed into one of the two private insurance plans, with an intended 50/50 split. A recent policy analysis estimated that 3,600 COFA Hawaii residents enrolled in coverage in Kaiser in 2015 and 5,500 in HMSA (Princeton, 2017).
III. Data Description
The data used in this study are provided by the Hawaii Health Information Corporation (HHIC), a private, not-for-profit organization that was based in Honolulu, Hawaii. HHIC collected data from hospitals in Hawaii. Its catchment area included all hospitals in the State of Hawaii. 5
We utilized raw data from HHIC that consisted of all utilizations of inpatient and emergency medical services over the period January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015 for all individuals with Japanese, Caucasian, or Micronesian ethnicities. In total, we used data on 409,556 specific utilizations. For our analysis, we only use utilizations for Hawaii residents (i.e. people with addresses in the State of Hawaii). These data include information on the type of discharge (i.e. inpatient or ER), admission and discharge dates, ethnicity (e.g. Micronesian, Japanese, or Caucasian), gender, age, payer type (e.g. Medicaid, private insurance), total billed/charged, and principal diagnosis and procedural codes. A critical feature of these data is that they include a unique patient identification number which allows us to identify the same patient over time in the raw data. This allows us to construct a panel in which we track utilization of a given individual for each month between January 2014 and December 2015. If no admissions are reported in a given month in the raw data, this indicates that no utilization likely took place in that month given the large catchment area of the HHIC data.
One important feature of the raw HHIC data is that they contain exact birthdates and death dates (for those who died during 2014-15 and provided that they died in a hospital). For people who were born during 2014-15, the panel begins on the month and year of their birth. For people who we know to have died during 2014-15, the panel ends on the month and year of their death.
Descriptive statistics from the raw discharge data are reported in Table 1a . The bulk of the sample is Caucasian comprising 65.6% of all utilizations, followed by Japanese (28.2%) and
Micronesians (6.3%). This sample has slightly more women (51.2%) than men (48.8%). Finally, most of the utilizations in our sample were for people on private plans (32.4%), Medicare (28.3%), and then Med-QUEST (28.0%). Roughly 4% of the utilizations in the raw data were billed to the patient (as opposed to an insurer).
To put the data in a format suitable for regression analysis, we created an individual-level panel in which we tracked utilization for all months between January 2014 and December 2015.
To do this, we computed the total number of admissions and charges in a given month for a given individual. We used the discharge date from the raw data to date the utilization. If no utilization took place for an individual in a month, we entered a zero for the cost and utilization Tables 1c and 1d . All statistics use the frequency weights and address the issue of omitted zeros. Table 1c reports statistics for all individuals and Table 1d reports statistics for COFA migrants for the period prior to March 1, 2015. In each of these Accordingly, the hospitalization rate for COFA migrants is more than twice that of the study sample. Similarly, the lower health status among COFA migrants is also reflected by the observation that Micronesians accounted for 6.3% of the study discharges for the three ethnicities, but 3.0% of the state's population of the corresponding ethnicities.
In Figure 1 charged to Medicaid than either the Japanese or Caucasians. Second, we see a discontinuous jump in total charges to public insurance for people 65 years and older. However, while utilizations of the Japanese and Caucasians are charged to Medicare, COFA migrants are by-andlarge covered by Medicaid when they are elderly which is consistent with the discussion in the previous section. Third, COFA migrants visit the ER at much higher rates than the other two groups. Fourth, there is a much higher rate of uninsured COFA migrants in ER usage than either the Japanese or Caucasians (see bottom row of the figure) .
Finally, we can use the statistics in 
IV. Methods
We employ a difference-in-difference (DD) research design. We let denote a particular outcome for individual at period . The unit of time, t, is measured in months and covers the 24 months between January 2014 and December 2015. The main outcomes that we consider are the number of inpatient admissions or ER visits in a month and the corresponding amount charged.
We further disaggregate visits by those that were charged to Medicaid, to private insurance, or to the individual. The treatment group is the COFA population which is identified as "Micronesian" in our data. Caucasians are our control group and the Japanese are our placebo group.
Our main estimation equation is the standard panel difference-in-difference model with twoway fixed effects for individuals and periods with some small modifications. Our main outcome variable is given by . We let denote a dummy that equals one if the individual is Japanese.
Similarly, is a dummy that is equal to one if the individual is Micronesian. We let denote an indicator for the period being March 2015 or later. In addition, −1, is an indicator for one quarter prior to the expiration of Medicaid benefits (Dec 2014 to Feb 2015) and −2, is an indicator for two quarters prior to the expiration of Medicaid benefits (Sep 2014 to Nov 2014).
The main estimation equation that we employ can then be expressed as:
The estimate of parameter, τ, is the difference-in-difference estimator which is informative of the effects of Medicaid on medical utilization among COFA migrants. We clustered all standard errors at the individual-level.
Estimation of this model also allows for two specification tests that are informative of the validity of the research design. The first is a test for differential pre-trends in the COFA population. This is an F-test of 0 : −2 = −1 = 0, which has a 2 2 distribution. The second is a test for parallel trends in our placebo group who are the Japanese. This is an F-test of 0 : 0 = −2 = −1 = 0, which has a 3 2 distribution. We also report an F-test of the null that the difference-in-difference parameter is zero, which has a 1 2 distribution.
Because we have a very large sample size, small deviations from these null hypotheses that would not have been detectable with a sample under 10,000, for example, will now be detectable. Our sample size is quite large with close to one million individuals who we observe for up to 24 months. As Deaton (1997) points out, "Larger sample sizes are like resolving power on a telescope; features that are not visible from a distance become more and more sharply delineated as the magnification is turned up." Leamer (1978) and Schwarz (1978) propose adjusting the critical values of statistical tests for the sample size to prevent the over-rejection of null hypotheses in large samples. In particular, they propose employing ln as the critical value of a 2 -test (see pp. 130-131 of Deaton 1997) . We report the Leamer-Schwarz critical values (L-S CV) in Table 2 .
V. Results

Core Results
We report our core results from estimation of equation (1) for adults ages 18-64 in Table 3 .
We restrict our sample to this age range for our main estimations because the Medicaid expiration did not impact children (under 18) or the elderly (65 or over). The table reports the results of 12 estimations. For each estimation, we report the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator as well as F-tests of the nulls that the pre-trend, placebo, and DiD parameters are zero.
The outcomes that we consider are inpatient admissions and ER visits reimbursed by any payer, a private payer, or Medicaid (reported in Panel A). We also consider charges for each of these six outcomes (reported in Panel B). Before we discuss the DiD estimates, we note that the specification tests in the table do not indicate any pre-trends or placebo effects.
In the panel A of Table 3 , we look at the effects of the policy change on inpatient admissions and ER visits. In the first column of this panel, we see that the policy had a negative but insignificant impact on inpatient admissions charged to any payer. Note that this effect is inclusive of utilizations that were funded by Medicaid and those that were funded by private insurance. In the fourth column of the same panel, we see that the Medicaid expiration had a larger negative impact on ER visits charged to any payer. The point estimate of the DiD parameter indicates a reduction in ER visits of 0.0045 per patient/month and the F-test of the null that the DiD parameter is 37 which greatly exceeds the L-S CV of 13.
Next, looking at utilization disaggregated by type of insurer (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6), we see that utilizations charged to Medicaid declined whereas those charged to private insurance increased. However, the magnitudes of the former effects are larger than the latter effects which is what accounts for the net negative impacts found in the "Any" payer columns (columns 1 and 4). In the second and fifth columns, we see that inpatient admissions and ER visits that were charged to Medicaid declined by 0.0029 and 0.0139 per patient-month. Both estimates have Fstatistics that greatly exceed their L-S CV. The reported means for these two outcomes (reported in the same table for the COFA population in the pre-period) are 0.0151 and 0.0445.
Accordingly, these effects amount to 19% and 31% decreases in utilization for the COFA migrants. In contrast, inpatient admissions and ER visits charged to private insurance increased by 0.0019 and 0.0064, respectively. Compared to the means of 0.0021 and 0.0124 of inpatient admissions and ER visits, these effects represent 90% and 52% increases. This indicates that the policy worked as expected with a shift in financing away from Medicaid and towards private insurers.
The second panel of Table 3 reports the effects of the Medicaid expiration on charges for inpatient admissions (columns 1-3) and ER visits (columns 4-6). These results closely mimic the results in Panel A. We see that the Medicaid expiration reduced charges for inpatient admissions and ER visits charged to Medicaid by $106 and $33, respectively. Both estimates are highly significant. As a percentage of the mean, these estimates constitute 22% and 32% decreases in charges. Conversely, the Medicaid expiration increased charges for inpatient admissions and ER visits charged to private insurers by $66 and $16, which constitute 104% and 47% increases.
Next, in Table 4 , we estimate the same models as in Table 3 but now we restrict the population to people over 65 years of age. This population was eligible for Medicaid throughout the sample period. We see no effects on this population.
In the Appendix, we report three additional sets of results. First, we estimate the same models as in Table 2 except that we employ alternative weights for COFA migrants. Our preferred weights in this paper are based on a five year count from the ACS from 2011-2015 of Micronesians in the State of Hawaii. However, given the possibility that Micronesians (like many other migrant groups) might be undercounted, we also employ the count from the ACS plus the reported margin of error of 3763. Accordingly, we also report a set of results using weights based off of a count of Micronesians that is slightly higher, 31,653. The results of this exercise are reported in Table A1 . Our qualitative findings are unaffected. For the second exercise (reported in Table A2 ), we use the log of total admissions and charges as the dependent variable. To account for the large number of zeros in the data, we added one to all observations.
Note that because of this, you cannot interpret these estimates as elasticities. We did this to ensure that our findings are not being driven by outliers. This is particularly important for the charges. The results indicate that this is not the case. Third, we examine the effects of the Medicaid expiration across genders (reported in Table A3 ). These results indicate that the Medicaid expiration affected women slightly more than men.
Effects on the Uninsured
We now look at how the Medicaid expiration affected uninsured utilization. We estimate our two-way fixed effects DiD model using inpatient admissions and ER visits that were not charged to any insurer (either public or private) as the dependent variable (results in Table 5 ).
We see impacts for COFA migrants ages 18-64, but not older than 65. Uninsured hospitalizations increased for people ages 18-64 by 0.0003 per patient/month, but this estimate has an F-statistic that is only marginally above the L-S CV of 13. Uninsured ER visits, on the other hand, increased dramatically for ages 18-64 by 0.0035 per patient/month. The F-statistic on this estimate is 83, which is far greater than the L-S CV. The magnitude of this estimate is 25% as large as the DiD estimate of the impact of the Medicaid expiration on Medicaid-funded ER visits from Table 3 . In the next section, we will show that the increase in uninsured ER use ramped up prior to the official expiration date. Accordingly, at least 25% of the decline in Medicaid-funded ER use was offset by uninsured ER use. The last two columns show no impacts on uninsured admissions among COFA migrants 65 and older.
Event Analysis
We now estimate an event study modification of equation (1):
For each of these estimations, we plot the estimates for all . 8 We normalize to be zero for February 2015, which is the month just prior to the expiration of benefits. These estimations will shed additional light on the parallel trends assumption. We estimate the model for ages 18-64.
We present the results in Figure 2 . The figure contains six graphs corresponding to inpatient utilization and ER visits and whether the payer Medicaid, private insurance, or the individual.
We report the results for inpatient utilization in the first row. We do not see evidence of pre-trends in any of the plots. Next, we see a sharp change in utilization funded by private insurance and Medicaid precisely in March of 2015 when Medicaid benefits expired. Finally, we do not see meaningful changes in self-funded hospitalizations in the third plot in the first row.
We report the results for ER visits in the second row. As with inpatient utilization, we do not see evidence of pre-trends when the payer was either private insurance or Medicaid. The magnitude of the decline in Medicaid-funded ER visits was substantially larger than the corresponding magnitude for the increase in ER visits funded by private insurance. Finally, we see that uninsured ER visits increased relative to the pre-period after Medicaid benefits expired.
Notably, this ramp-up occurred prior to the date at which Medicaid benefits officially expired. 
Results by Age
We now investigate heterogeneity in the treatment effect by age. For this, we estimate a variant of the two way fixed effects model in which we include a complete set of age dummies as well as their interactions with the COFA dummy. The model is
where denotes a five year age bin between ages one and 85. For these estimations, we exclude infants and people older than 85. 10 For each estimation, we plot the coefficient on the interaction between the DiD variable and the five-year age bin denoted by the parameter, . In the next subsection, we will consider infants (and children) separately. As before, the figure contains six figures corresponding to type of utilization (inpatient or ER) and payer (private insurance, Medicaid, or self). Each plot contains two vertical lines at ages 18 and 65. The Medicaid expiration should have only affected people between these ages.
We see that the expiration of benefits mainly impacted adults between ages 18 and 64.
However, there is evidence that Medicaid-funded ER visits by children declined. Medicaid eligibility did not change for children and, so this decline should not have happened.
Effects on the Infants and Children
9 Private communication with physicians working at Queens Medical Center in Honolulu indicated that just prior to the expiration of COFA Medicaid program benefits, there was a sense that it would be difficult to enroll uninsured COFA migrants in the State's Medicaid program due to the policy uncertainty so many providers may not have put forth the typical effort to support enrollment for those otherwise uninsured. 10 As before, we are combining Japanese and Caucasian people into a single control group for the sake of parsimony.
Finally, we explore how the expiration of benefits affected Micronesian infants and children. To do this, we estimate a variant of equation (1) for children under 18. For some specifications, we include an infant dummy and its interaction with the COFA/POST variable (as well as all of the other associated interactions). We only consider utilizations charged to Medicaid.
We report the results in Table 6 . The table consists of eight columns corresponding to four outcomes: inpatient admissions, ER visits, inpatient charges, and ER charges. For each outcome, we report the estimation of equation (1) without the infant interactions in the odd columns and, in the even columns, we report the results with the infant interactions.
The results indicate that the expiration of Medicaid benefits for adults affected children.
We see that there was a decline in inpatient admissions and charges (columns 1 and 5). In addition, we see that there was a much larger decline in inpatient admissions and charges for infants (columns 2 and 6). There was also a decline in ER visits and charges (columns 3 and 7).
However, there was a substantial increase in ER visits and charges for infants (columns 4 and 8).
The contrasting effects of the expiration of benefits on the utilization of infants are important.
We showed that inpatient admissions declined precipitously whereas ER visits increased by a large magnitude. While our hospital data is not ideal for pinning down the precise mechanism, we suspect that the expiration of Medicaid program benefits for many COFA migrants generally led to a decline in the use of ambulatory care for newborns.
This may have led to two consequences. The first is that the use of ER visits for neonatal care increased. The second was a decline in inpatient admissions, which may have happened since primary care physicians refer patients for surgery and other inpatient services.
Prima facie, these effects on infants are puzzling since pregnant women and legally residing children were still technically covered by Medicaid after March, 2015 (i.e. the policy change should not have affected this group). What these results suggest then is that, despite their continued eligibility, there were still many children and pregnant mothers who did not use the available state-provided Medicaid services -perhaps because they were unaware that they continued to be eligible for CHIPRA coverage.
In some sense, this can be viewed as a reverse woodworking effect. Benefits expired for a large swath of the Micronesian population in Hawaii. As previously discussed, young COFA migrants were actually still covered by the State's CHIPRA program. However, it appears as if the salience of the expiration of benefits for the majority of migrants led many eligible migrants to believe that they were not covered. To this end, Hofschneider (2019) says, "parents are sometimes confused about why they have different insurance from their children, or mistakenly think that because they aren't covered that their children aren't either." In a similar vein, but in the opposite direction, Frean, et al. (2017) found that the expansion of Medicaid under the ACA increased enrollment in Medicaid among people who were previously eligible for Medicaid benefits.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the effects of eliminating Medicaid program coverage for a vulnerable migrant population in the State of Hawaii. To do this, we employed a large administrative database that constitutes close to a census of all inpatient and emergency room utilizations during 2014 and 2015. Difference-in-difference models indicate that the expiration of benefits decreased Medicaid-funded inpatient and emergency room utilizations for adults ages 18 to 64 by 31% and 19%, respectively. Privately-funded utilizations increased by 90% for inpatient admissions and 52% for emergency room visits. On net, the magnitudes of the publicly-funded utilization did not make up for the decline in Medicaid-funded utilization resulting in a net decline in utilization for Micronesian adults after the expiration of Medicaid program benefits.
Some of the shortfall in Medicaid-funded utilization of the ER was made up for by utilizations of uninsured patients. We find that there was a marked increase in ER visits that were charged to the patient (as opposed to Medicaid) that began earlier than the official expiration date of Medicaid benefits. This is a puzzle. Ostensibly, COFA migrants should have been eligible for Medicaid benefits up to March of 2015. Our best guess is that COFA migrants who were enrolled in Medicaid were allowed to obtain Medicaid benefits until March of 2015.
However, many COFA migrants who were uninsured before March of 2015 (and, hence, eligible for Medicaid) and who sought care in the ER were not enrolled in Medicaid.
We also saw the expiration of Medicaid benefits for Micronesian adults affected Micronesian children. COFA migrants under age 18 remained eligible for the State's CHIPRA program throughout the sample period. In addition, we saw that there was a dramatic increase in Medicaid-funded ER visits by Micronesian infants after the general Medicaid benefits expired.
Unfortunately, it is hard to pin down the precise mechanism underlying this finding, but we suspect that Micronesian parents substituted ER visits for ambulatory care for their newborns once Medicaid benefits expired. These findings suggest a failure to effectively communicate that the children of COFA migrants would continue to be eligible for Medicaid even after benefits for most other COFA migrants ended.
Many of these undesirable effects were predicted at the time of the expiration of benefits.
For example, Hagiwara, et al. in the May 2015 issue of the Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved said, "There is concern that this process, which has proven to be confusing even for native English speakers, will at best be confusing for COFA migrants and at worst cause individuals to be uninsured and possibly forgo needed health care." These prognostications turned out to be true.
An important take-away of this study for policy makers is that moving poorer people from Medicaid programs to private insurance obtained from exchanges, even when private COFA migrants must first apply for Medicaid and get rejected before they can enroll in private insurance (Hofschneider 2019) . For these reasons, we would expect a transition from Medicaid to private insurance to reduce medical demand and/or utilization.
While this study focuses on a very unique policy change affecting a relatively small population, it can provide lessons to other policy makers. In particular, we have shown the difficulties of using private insurance obtained through exchanges to provide coverage to vulnerable migrant populations with low levels of education and English proficiency. Note that these difficulties persisted despite premiums that were subsidized by public funds. Medicaid appears to provide clarity and certainty that private insurers may not have been able to provide. for , ∈ {0,1}. Next, we note that
This is true because = 0 implies that = 0. Accordingly, we obtain that The frequency weights that we employ are based off of the five-year population counts from the ACS reported in Table 1b . We used these counts to construct frequencies for gender/age/period/ethnicity cells. Note that the sample of Micronesians in Hawaii in any given
year of the ACS is quite small, but five year averages of the ACS can be used to arrive at a fairly reliable aggregate population count. However, as pointed out by Fernandez, et al. (2018) , using the ACS to construct precise counts of specific age groups and, particularly, the very young is very difficult. This is especially true for relatively small groups such as Micronesians as there is only about 200-300 Micronesians in Hawaii total in any given ACS year. Accordingly, we used the ACS to compute the proportions of Japanese, Caucasian, and Micronesian females and males who were under and over 65 which is a relatively broad category. We then used these proportions to count the numbers of each ethnicity/gender category under and over 65 and took the difference between these counts and the counts in the HHIC data. These numbers constitute the number of omitted zeros in each gender/ethnicity category under and over age 65. The resulting number of omitted zeros was then evenly allocated to each age between zero and 85. 
